West Germany and A Moral Failure: The BND, built on the ashes of Nazi intelligence, shamelessly employed war criminals like SS officers and Einsatzgruppen murderers, while Adenauer’s government turned a blind eye with cold-blooded pragmatism. Backed by the U.S., the young Federal Republic sold its democratic soul for Cold War gains, shielding these atrocities for decades. Even today, hidden files and half-hearted reckonings expose a democracy that buried its Nazi past rather than confront it.
The history of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), West Germany’s foreign intelligence service, in the early years of the Federal Republic is a grim chapter that exposes the moral and political compromises of a fledgling democracy under the shadow of the Cold War. The deliberate recruitment of former National Socialists—including members of the SS, Gestapo, and Einsatzgruppen—by the BND and its predecessor, the Gehlen Organization, raises enduring questions about accountability, cover-ups, and the willingness to sacrifice democratic values for pragmatic interests. This article critically examines the BND’s entanglement with ex-Nazis, the complicity of Konrad Adenauer’s government, and the long-term consequences of these decisions.
The Gehlen Organization: A Legacy of the Nazi Intelligence Apparatus
In the aftermath of World War II, West Germany faced pressure to establish itself as a reliable ally of the Western powers amid the emerging Cold War. In 1946, the Gehlen Organization was founded, named after Reinhard Gehlen, a former Wehrmacht German Army officer and intelligence chief, who had gathered intelligence during the war. Gehlen offered his expertise and network to the U.S., which, desperate for information about the Soviet threat, accepted his proposal and provided financial and logistical support. In 1956, the Gehlen Organization transitioned into the BND, becoming the official foreign intelligence service of the Federal Republic.
What appeared as a pragmatic decision soon revealed itself as a moral disaster. Gehlen deliberately recruited former members of the Wehrmacht, SS, Gestapo, and Sicherheitsdienst (SD). Historical investigations, such as those conducted by the BND’s independent historians’ commission, reveal that in the early 1950s, approximately 90% of the Gehlen Organization’s personnel came from Nazi-affiliated circles. Even in the 1960s, after the transition to the BND, about half of its employees still had ties to the Nazi regime. Most shocking is the fact that at least 33 later BND employees had served in the Einsatzgruppen during the war—units responsible for the systematic murder of millions of Jews, Roma, communists, and others.
Prominent Cases: War Criminals in the BND’s Ranks
The roster of Nazi perpetrators who found employment in the BND reads like a catalog of war criminals. Wilhelm Beisner, a former Waffen-SS member who worked for the Reich Security Main Office, joined the BND in 1957 and even recruited other Nazi criminals, such as Walter Rauff, who was involved in developing gas vans used for mass murder. Heinz Felfe, a former SS-Obersturmführer, rose to become one of the BND’s most influential agents until 1961, when he was exposed as a KGB double agent leaking sensitive information to Moscow. Alois Brunner, a notorious SS officer and close associate of Adolf Eichmann, responsible for the deportation of tens of thousands of Jews, maintained contacts with the BND after the war and later found refuge in Syria.
These cases were not anomalies but the result of a deliberate policy. Gehlen and his inner circle fostered a culture of loyalty to old Nazi networks, prioritizing camaraderie and supposed “professionalism” over ethical considerations. The recruitment of such individuals was often justified by their “expertise,” particularly their knowledge of the Soviet Union. However, the historians’ commission has shown that many of these individuals were not indispensable specialists. Rather, their hiring was a conscious choice to integrate Nazi perpetrators instead of training new, untainted personnel.
The Federal Government’s Role: Adenauer and the Cover-Up
Responsibility for this practice does not rest solely with Gehlen or the Americans. Konrad Adenauer’s federal government played a central role in enabling and concealing this scandalous personnel policy. Hans Globke, Adenauer’s close confidant and head of the Federal Chancellery, was himself a Nazi-tainted jurist who had co-authored commentary on the Nuremberg Race Laws. Globke used the BND for political purposes, such as monitoring the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and shielded the agency from thorough scrutiny of its Nazi past. Adenauer himself justified hiring ex-nazis with the maxim that one does not “throw out dirty water” until clean water is available.
This attitude reflected the priorities of the early Federal Republic: stability, anti-communism, and economic reconstruction took precedence over a rigorous reckoning with the Nazi past. Denazification in West Germany was often superficial, allowing many former Nazi perpetrators to assume high-ranking positions under false identities or with falsified résumés. The BND became a microcosm of these continuities, where Cold War interests overshadowed moral accountability.
Internal Purges: A Half-Hearted Attempt
In the early 1960s, as the BND’s Nazi past drew increasing public criticism, internal measures were taken to remove tainted employees. A special investigative team identified and dismissed between 71 and 200 individuals with proven involvement in Nazi crimes between 1962 and 1965. However, this process was neither comprehensive nor transparent. Many files were destroyed or redacted, and those in charge at the BND and the Chancellery had little interest in a full reckoning. The dismissals served more as damage control than a genuine effort at self-purification.
The Cold War as Justification
A central aspect of this controversy is the Cold War’s role. The United States, which funded and supported the Gehlen Organization, was fully aware of the Nazi backgrounds of many employees but saw no obstacle. On the contrary, the CIA actively encouraged the recruitment of ex-Nazis, viewing them as valuable assets in the fight against communism. This stance was adopted by the federal government, which saw the BND as a strategic tool in the geopolitical chess game. However, prioritizing “security” over ethics came at a steep cost: the BND became an institution that not only protected Nazi perpetrators but also perpetuated their networks and, in some cases, their ideologies.
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) exploited these entanglements for propaganda, branding the BND a “Nazi agency.” While politically motivated, this criticism was factually accurate. The Federal Republic’s reluctance to address this past early on reinforced the perception that the young democracy was compromising its values.
Long-Term Consequences and Reckoning
The reckoning with the BND’s Nazi past began only decades later. Since 2011, an independent historians’ commission, including scholars like Gerhard Sälter and Klaus-Dietmar Henke, has investigated the agency’s entanglements. Their reports confirm that the recruitment of Nazi perpetrators was not an oversight but a deliberate strategy, enabled by U.S. support and the federal government’s acquiescence. Nevertheless, many files remain inaccessible, hindering full transparency to this day.
The employment of ex-Nazis in the BND had not only moral but also practical consequences. The infiltration by double agents like Heinz Felfe demonstrated the questionable loyalty of many employees. Moreover, the Nazi taint undermined public trust in the BND as a democratic institution. The fact that war criminals like Alois Brunner received new identities or escape routes with BND assistance casts a dark shadow over the early Federal Republic’s priorities.
Critical Reflection: A Moral Failure
The history of the BND and its ex-Nazi employees is a testament to the moral failure of the early Federal Republic. While the young democracy presented itself as a break with the Nazi dictatorship, the BND’s practices revealed the opposite: continuities in personnel, networks, and mindsets. The decision to recruit Nazi perpetrators was not a mere necessity but a deliberate compromise that placed Cold War interests above accountability for the victims of National Socialism.
The BND’s entanglements also shed light on the federal government’s role. Adenauer’s pragmatism, bolstered by figures like Globke, reveals a willingness to ignore the Nazi past to pursue political and strategic goals. This failure was not only a problem of the BND but a systemic issue in the Federal Republic, which failed to draw a clear line between itself and the Nazi era.