Introduction
The interview with Yakov Kedmi, the former head of the Israeli Bureau for Jewish Affairs in Eastern Europe (“Nativ”), offers a glimpse into a highly controversial chapter in Israeli history. Kedmi’s role in orchestrating the mass Aliya from the Soviet Union in the 1990s, under the guise of state necessity, raises significant ethical questions. In his candid responses, he unapologetically reveals that his actions, aimed at fulfilling the interests of the state of Israel, were at times executed with little regard for the individual rights or desires of those affected. With chilling confidence, he admits to manipulating the fate of thousands, pushing them towards Israel not necessarily for their benefit, but as part of a broader geopolitical strategy. This stark admission sparks a crucial debate on the balance between state interests and personal freedoms, revealing a morally gray area in the narrative of Israel’s modern history.
OPERATION “BIG ALIYA”
The start date of the “Big Aliya” from the USSR and the former Soviet republics is something few people remember. Perhaps it is uncomfortable to recall. The fact is, the “Big Aliya” of the 1990s—one of the most significant events of modern Zionism—did not begin with the fall of the “Iron Curtain” nor as a result of a surge in Zionist sentiments. It began due to a decision by the U.S. Congress to revoke the right to immigrate to the United States for citizens who left the USSR in response to calls to move to Israel. This decision was made on October 1, 1989.
Yakov Kedmi is a former head of the Israeli Bureau for Jewish Affairs in Eastern Europe (“Nativ”), the man who, by his initiative, helped many Jews end up in Tel Aviv, Kiryat Motzkin, or Dimona, rather than in Brooklyn, San Francisco, or Boston.
“NATIV” – ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
• Yakov, you are probably the highest-ranking Israeli intelligence officer from the “Russian” community. What is your rank?
• There are no ranks in Israeli intelligence services. But if we compare it to the military hierarchy, I held the rank of “Aluf be-Tzava” – which is equivalent to Major General.
• You arrived in Israel before the Aliya of the 1970s. Your repatriation story is unusual…
• Yes, it all began in January 1967. I was 19 years old at the time. I managed to break into the Israeli embassy in Moscow, and the first people to meet me there were the workers from “Nativ.” I asked, “How can I leave for Israel?” They told me that Israel would gladly accept me, but how I would leave the USSR was my problem.
• But “Nativ” is an intelligence service, like the Mossad or the Shin Bet?
• That was the case until recently. Until I was its head, it was indeed an intelligence service.
• Did “Nativ” carry out unconventional operations?
• Yes. For example, in the early years of the Jewish state’s existence, it was simply the illegal transport of Jews out of Eastern European countries. It reached the point where vehicles were equipped with double bottoms, or some other hiding spots, with repatriates carrying fake documents as they were transported through one or two countries.
• Were such operations carried out during your time?
• Of course, but in different ways. Not with fake documents… At least not the whole way with fake documents. I remember several operations. Even people were smuggled out of the USSR without the Soviet authorities knowing about it.
KIRYAT-MALACHI INSTEAD OF LOS ANGELES
• Did “Nativ” have any involvement with the Aliya of the 1990s?
• Any Aliya that occurred after the creation of “Nativ” in 1952 was the work of “Nativ.” This includes the Aliya from the USSR and from Albania.
• But the Aliya of the 1990s was a result of a decision made by American congressmen.
• The U.S. authorities decided that the process for emigration from the USSR to the U.S. should be moved from Rome to Moscow. This practically forced those wishing to emigrate to the U.S. to submit their documents not in Rome, but in Moscow. The Americans hoped that this would organize the emigration flow that was intensifying towards the United States.
• Let’s call things by their real names: by “chaotic flow,” you mean that Jews who had received exit visas from the USSR for Israel would travel through Vienna to Rome, where they would apply for emigration to the United States and then leave for the U.S. Is that correct?
• Yes, not only to the United States but also to Australia and Canada. The problem was that the American bureaucratic system couldn’t handle the flood of emigrants. The Americans started to realize that something was out of control within this flow…
At the same time, almost all Israeli structures were caught off guard by the decision of the U.S. authorities, including “Sokhnut” (the Jewish Agency). The new order was introduced solely to serve U.S. interests. They decided to take control of a process that had previously been controlled by the Soviet authorities.
• What did “Nativ” do?
• In early September 1989, representatives of several embassies, including myself, were invited by the U.S. ambassador. At that time, I had been in Moscow for a year as part of the Israeli consular group at the Netherlands embassy, which mostly consisted of “Nativ” workers. The U.S. ambassador announced that starting October 1, the U.S. would introduce a new procedure. I listened, then called Israel and said I needed to urgently come and speak with the Prime Minister to discuss the situation. And I went.
• Just like that: you called Israel and said you wanted to meet with the Prime Minister…
• We only reported to the Prime Minister and always informed him directly. If something important came up in Moscow, I would say I needed to meet with him. Usually, the meeting would happen within a day of my arrival in Israel. Sometimes, I’d go straight to the Prime Minister from the airport, but if I wasn’t insisting on an immediate meeting, I might have to wait a day. This time, I met with the then head of “Nativ,” David Bar-Tov, and we went to meet with Yitzhak Shamir. I briefed him on the situation. I said that, in my opinion, there was an opportunity to stop what was called “filtering,” which meant rejecting Jews trying to enter Israel. I realized that the American system would not work because there was no mechanism to prevent Jews from arriving in Vienna and Rome. Once they arrived there… Even if the Americans said they wouldn’t accept them, it would only take three weeks for ten thousand people to gather who would be accepted nowhere. They would stage demonstrations in the streets—and American Jews, along with public opinion, would force the authorities to change their decision. So, I identified the task: we needed to use the American decision to prevent Jews from arriving in Vienna.
• If the emigrants had arrived there, could they have changed the U.S. decision?
• If they had arrived there, the U.S. decision would have been worthless.
• And you ensured that they didn’t get there?
• I devised a mechanism to prevent that. I proposed to the Prime Minister that a new procedure be introduced at the embassy: people would only get visas if they had tickets to leave for Israel via Bucharest or Budapest. By that time, “Nativ” had already established its bases in those cities.
• Why were Bucharest and Budapest better than Vienna?
• From Bucharest, there was no “filtering.” Ceausescu had promised that. So, from Bucharest, people could only go to Israel. The same was true for Budapest. These were socialist countries. There was order, and everyone traveled according to the documents they had. It was clear that from there, people would only reach Israel. I planned to minimize the time people spent in Budapest and limit their mobility as much as possible. I knew very well who I was dealing with. I knew how “filtering” began, how it developed, and what methods could combat it.
I arrived in Moscow, requested a meeting with the Dutch ambassador, and he received me. I said I had been to Israel, spoken with the Prime Minister, and starting the next day, the procedure would change. People who received visas before a certain date would still be able to go to Vienna, but everyone else would go to Bucharest and Budapest.
• In other words, you forced people to go to Israel?
• Yes, I arranged with the Austrian embassy and asked its workers to act according to the law: to only issue the Austrian visa after the Israeli visa had been issued. After the Israeli visa was given at 5 PM, there were only three hours before the plane to Bucharest and Budapest left. All embassies were closed by then.
HOW WE SAVED ISRAEL
• Aren’t you afraid that our viewers might spit at their screens?
• I fear nothing. Least of all the people. We did what we believed was necessary for the state and the Jewish people. As a result, today there are one million more Russian-speaking residents in Israel. My colleagues from other intelligence services, once the implementation of my plan started, said: “Guys, you just saved our country.
• Why did they say that?
• Imagine if Israel’s population had decreased by a million Jews. What would the political structure of the country have been with the continuous and rapid growth of the Arab population? What would the economy have looked like? Without Jews from Russia, there would be no Israeli high-tech industry. So, thanks to the Big Aliya, our country was saved—economically and demographically. Not only that: the Arabs were stunned when they saw the massive Aliya heading to Israel. This was the main factor that forced them to reconcile with Israel, to realize that there was nothing more to be done. Without this Aliya, Israel might not have been viable today.
• Do you feel any remorse for the people you pushed directly to Israel, even though they might have had other plans?
• I understand that Kiryat Malachi is not Los Angeles, although the meaning of these city names is the same. Yes, Israel turned out to be different than what it should have been for the Jews who arrived. The discriminatory attitude of some sectors of Israeli society towards Jews from the USSR and the former Soviet republics continues and hasn’t diminished…
• Do you think Israeli society is biased against “Russians”?
• I see it, I feel it. And every Russian-speaking Israeli feels it daily. But reality in Israel is determined—and will be determined!—by the people who live here. In other words, it largely depends on us what Israel will be like. If we weren’t here, Israel would be different. And the fact that we are here gives hope that we can make this country what it should be. Thanks to this, we are sitting in a studio of Russian-speaking Israeli television, speaking Russian, and the people watching understand Russian and are not ashamed that they are watching Russian-language TV. They probably aren’t spitting at the screen now… When I’m asked about Russian-language television or newspapers, I say that I prefer Jews speaking Russian in Ashdod to Jews speaking Russian in Moscow.
Interview by Vladimir Beder, host of the “Israel Plus” channel, “News of the Week,” Israel.
Conclusion:
While Kedmi’s actions might be framed as necessary for the survival and growth of Israel, they stand in stark contrast to the ideals of freedom and self-determination. His statement—“I fear nothing. Least of all the people”—suggests a disconcerting prioritization of the state’s interests over the individual. For many, this raises unsettling questions: Did Kedmi and others who followed in his footsteps treat people as pawns in a grand political game, or were their actions ultimately justified by the historical context? Whatever the answer, the story of the “Big Aliya” serves as a powerful reminder of the complexities that arise when national interests collide with personal autonomy, leaving behind a legacy that continues to provoke debate.
Original source was deleted in the meantime, and the article can only be found via the Internet Archive.
